"Trade Based Constitutionalisms: A Framework for Universalising Substantive International law" by Fitzgerald, Brian F.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUT Digital Repository:  
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/ 
Fitzgerald, Brian F. (1996) "Trade Based Constitutionalisms: A Framework for 
Universalising Substantive International law". University of Miami Yearbook of 
International Law 5:131. 
 
          © Copyright 1996 Brian F. Fitzgerald 
 1
 
 
 
B Fitzgerald, “Trade Based Constitutionalisms: A Framework for Universalising 
Substantive International law” (1996-7) 5 University of Miami Yearbook of International 
Law 131 
 
 
 TRADE BASED CONSTITUTIONALISMS:  
 The Framework For Universalizing Substantive  
 International Law? 
 
 BY BRIAN F. FITZGERALD  
BA (GU) LLB (Hons) (QUT) BCL (Oxford) LLM (Harvard) Law School Griffith 
University Australia  
* I wish to thank Anne Marie Slaughter, David Kennedy, Wendy Gordon, and  Anne Fitzgerald. 
 2
 
 
 
                    
 
INTRODUCTION: CONSTRUCTING1 UNIVERSALITY IN THE FACE OF 
DIFFERENCE 
 
Over the last thirty years international law has sought to do more than simply facilitate the 
peaceful coexistence of states. It has aimed to implement international social and political 
cooperation through international substantive law (e.g. environmental law, human rights). The 
coexistence program sought simply to draw lines between nations and maintain peace (external), 
while the cooperation program has strived to harmonize the social and political structures of 
states (internal).2
 
     1 This term is used to emphasize the view of the writer that law is a process of construction, 
not simply a given: James Boyle, Ideals and Things: International Legal Scholarship and the 
Prison-House of Language 26 HARV. INTL L. J. 327 (1985); Outi K. Korhonen, New 
International Law: Silence Defence or Deliverance? 7 EUROPEAN JNL INT'L L. 1 (1996). 
     2 The development of substantive international law has urged academic consideration of the 
possibility of world governance and universality of substantive laws: LOUIS HENKIN, 
RICHARD C. PUGH, OSCAR SCHACTER, HANS SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS, xxix-xxxi (3rd ed. 1993); WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE 
CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (hereafter "CSIL") (1964); Louis 
Henkin, The Mythology of Sovereignty, ASIL NEWSLETTER March-May 1993, 1. In more 
recent times the 'law amongst liberal nations' school has given added dimension to the notion of 
universal liberal norms of cooperation and coexistence: AM Slaughter, Law Among Liberal 
States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine 92 COLUMBIA LR 1907 (1992); 
International law and International Relations Theory 87 AJIL 205 (1993); The Liberal Agenda 
for Peace: International Relations Theory and the UN  4  JNL of TRANS L & COM PROB 377 
(1994); International Law in a World of Liberal State 6 EJIL 1 (1995). However the points of 
reconciliation for nations with differing viewpoints as to the content of substantive international 
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My aim is to outline the movement to, and different nature of, the cooperation program and then 
to analyze the process for achieving the harmonization or universalization inherent in 
cooperation. When the project of international law was merely one of coexistence, universality 
(of the structural/external rules of international law) was less problematic but once the program 
changed to include cooperation the internal fabric of the state came into question and the 
establishment of universal norms (norms which all nations support) became less certain in the 
face of cultural, ideological, economic and religious difference.  
 
The primary aim of this article is to establish how universal norms of substantive international 
law are being, and will be, constructed. My suggestion is that the universalizing framework has 
moved or is moving from traditional public international law fora to the international trade 
law remain vague. Little has been written about "constructing universal substantive norms of 
international law in the face of difference": Consider: OSCAR SCHACTER, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: GENERAL COURSE IN PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, Chapter XV (1985), where Schacter talks of managing the 
"antinomies" (differences) inherent in the internationalization of human rights.  There is a 
mountain of writing on cultural relativism and human rights - e.g. in the context of the rights of 
children see: Philip Alston, The Best Interests Principle Towards A Reconciliation Of Culture 
And Human Rights, 8 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE FAMILY 1 (1994), 
in the context of feminist theory see: Nancy Kim, Towards a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: 
Straddling the Fence between Western Imperialism and Uncritical Absolutism 25 COLUMBIA 
HUMAN RIGHTS LR 49 (1993) - but these writings tend to take an "all or nothing" approach, 
while ignoring the significance of managing difference. 
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regime.3 I wish to examine why this is happening and with what effect. In this regard I will focus 
on the new WTO/GATT charter and its appendage of substantive norms of intellectual property 
to the trade regime.  
 
     3 Since the 1950s we have witnessed the introduction and rapid development of trade 
motivated, international (GATT) and transnational (EEC) agreements. In the 1990s these trade 
based agreements have matured into much more than simple trade agreements; they now 
represent "constitutional systems" which impact heavily upon social and political affairs. My 
usage of the word constitutionalism in this situation may be problematical for some so let me 
explain what I mean. Outside of domestic constitutionalisms we have seen the rise of a 
transnational constitutionalism in Europe. European Law scholars tend to suggest that a 
constitutionalism is something that affects the rights of individuals directly, or that allows 
individuals to enforce rights: Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the making of a Transnational 
Constitution 75 AJIL 1 (1981); Jan Tumlir, GATT Rules and Community Law - A Comparison of 
Economics and Legal Functions 1 at 10, in M HILF, FG JACOBS, EU PETERSMANN, THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT in Studies in Transnational Economic Law v 4 
(1986); J.H.H. Weiler The Transformation of Europe 100 YALE L.J. 2409 (1991). But at 
broadest, a constitutional system is something that distributes/governs/regulates power [on the 
notion of power see: M Foucault Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 
1972-77 (Colin Gordon ed.) Brighton, Harvester Press (1980)] and no matter who can enforce it, 
ultimately it is the individual that bears the effects of that distribution of power. Professor John 
Jackson sees the domestic and international law relating to trade making up the "trade 
constitution", which acts to "impose different levels of restraint on the policy options available to 
public or private leaders": WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, 299 (1989). With the advent of a 
compulsory and enforceable dispute resolution system which can impact, through retaliation, 
directly on the lives of private citizens, and with the addition of important substantive norms to 
GATT, it seems certain that many scholars would follow Jackson in calling this a constitutional 
system, more so than public international law which lacks a compulsory judicial enforcement 
procedure. It seems arrogant to deny the trade regime the status of a constitutional system and it 
is in categorizing it as such that we may better understand how individuals intersect with it. 
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PART I: THE SPACES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOURCES PROCESS AND 
SUBSTANCE 
 
As this is a article about one specific area of international law, namely substantive international 
law, it is necessary at the outset to introduce a framework for understanding the different spaces 
of international law. The most developed framework for understanding the different spaces for 
international law is the "representational framework" presented by David Kennedy.  
  
In teaching and writing about international law David Kennedy employs a framework of analysis 
- mirroring/parodying the prevailing casebook "representation" of public international law - 
which moves through a chronological/progress narrative4 of sources, process and substance.5 
Constitutionalism might better be seen as a layered rather than unitary; we have and interact with 
many constitutionalisms in our daily life. It is not simply a question of which constitutionalism is 
supreme but rather how constitutionalisms, that do exist, impact upon us; and this is why the 
availability of a compulsory and coercive judicial review/enforcement mechanism is so 
important in assessing the strengths of constitutionalisms. 
     4 A progress narrative that is forever locked in a battle between sovereign autonomy (The Case 
of The SS Lotus (France v Turkey), PCIJ, 2 Hudson World Court Report 20: restrictions on the 
independence of States cannot be presumed) and sovereign community (erga omnes, human 
rights): see further Brian F Fitzgerald Portugal v Australia: Deploying the Missiles of Sovereign 
Autonomy and Sovereign Community 37 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 260 (1996); MARTTI 
KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA (1989). The tension is clear in the move 
from process to substance. As international law seeks to regulate more and more of the internal 
structure of states the cry of sovereign autonomy is heard. This is where universality enters the 
picture.  
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While bits and pieces of this framework are thrown out by the current tradition of international 
legal jurisprudence, by the prevailing casebooks etc, the genius of Kennedy's work is to draw out 
a coherent framework of analysis which explains the representations of the current tradition. 
 
i) The Move From Process (Coexistence) to Substance (Cooperation)  
 
Kennedy's framework is particularly relevant to this essay in explaining the move from process 
to substance, from international norms of coexistence to norms of cooperation. In Kennedy's 
framework the realm of process governs issues such as statehood, recognition, responsibility, 
jurisdiction and international institutions6; the so termed "international plane". This in Kennedy's 
framework is the one true point of universality7; the construction of a platform upon which states 
     5 DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES 8 (1986); David 
Kennedy, A New Stream of International Law Scholarship, 7 WISCONSIN INTERNATIONAL 
LJ 1, 30-36 (1988)(hereafter referred to as "New Stream"); Phillip Trimble, International Law, 
World Order and Critical Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811 (1990) 
     6 Kennedy, New Stream, supra n 5, 33. 
     7 Universality has always been an awkward question for the progress narrative. In the 
beginning it ignored the primitive (H. WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
44-47 (1936); ANTHONY ANGHIE, CREATING THE NATION STATE: COLONIALISM 
AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 62 (SJD Dissertation Harvard Law School, 
1995) - citing Montesquieu -’every nation has a law of nations - even the Iroqouis who eat their 
prisoners, have one’; Gray J’s use of the word "civilized" in The Paquete Habana 175 US 677 
(1900); cf Vitoria who presented a theory of a universal international law; Marshall CJ in The 
Antelope 23 US (Wheaton 10) 66 (1825)) then embraced all in the mode of coexistence (in 
pursuit of colonization ANGHIE 62ff.) and then Friedmann in a lust for international law 
grabbed for substance where universality was not possible so he suggested a segmented 
universality which would open the door to at least "some" form of sovereign community. 
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can coexist.8  The move towards substance though asks that the platform be raised, and it is at 
this point that difference threatens to destroy universality.9   
 
The raising of the platform, as Kennedy's rehearsal of the progress narrative of the prevailing 
casebook "representation" depicts, began in the early 1960's when international law expanded 
from a role of mere coordination (coexistence) to one of substance (cooperation). The focus of 
this move was the internal structure of the state, for with the move to substance international law 
was no longer simply mediating the interaction of territorial units but was now determining the 
welfare of the citizens of the world. And this in turn is why the move from process to substance 
became so problematical; because it ventured deeper into the heart of sovereign 
autonomy/culture placing greater strain on the notion of universality (the degree to which states 
could/would agree). This point is crucial to this article which aims to establish how substantive 
law is constructed or universalized.  
 
In summary, Kennedy's framework suggests that international law is divided into three temporal 
and spatial contexts: sources, process and substance; and that in the move from process (basic 
structural rules) to substance (cultural and social norms) the universalizing ability of international 
law is greatly reduced.     
 
a) Friedmann’s Manifesto For Change 
 
 
     8 Kennedy, New Stream, supra n 5, 32-4.  
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In presenting the move from process to substance as represented by the current tradition of 
international law, Kennedy has been guided by the work of Wolfgang Friedmann. Therefore to 
fully appreciate the movement from process to substance it is helpful to consider the work of 
Friedmann.  
 
The move from process to substance was articulated with commitment, excitement and 
exactitude in Wolfgang Friedmann's seminal work, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (hereafter "CSIL") (1964).10 It is worthy of mention that Friedmann 
was a refugee from Germany who had become somewhat of a cosmopolitan globe trotter - it is 
no wonder he wished to see the demise of territorial sovereignty in its naked/nastiest form. 
 
Friedmann explained in CSIL, his manifesto for the new world order, that in our time11
  
 1) international law was in a move from coexistence (process) to  cooperation (substance 
and welfare) 
 2) and that in entering the realm of cooperation universality would be tested by the religious, 
economic and ideological diversity of the world. 
  
                                        
     9 Kennedy, New Stream, supra n 5, 35. 
     10 See also WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (1969) the template upon which Henkin Pugh Schacter and Smit’s book of the 
same name is written. 
     11 The fact that we are in transition to substance is presented through a continual use of the 
expression 'in our time’  - see also LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 20 (1979). 
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For Friedmann the times were exciting. He was witnessing a move from a classical system of 
international law focused primarily on the coordination of sovereign activity (process) to a 
system of  international law focused on the welfare of the citizens of the world. Here was a 
chance to peel back the wrapper of sovereignty and to delve into the internal construction of 
states in the name of public world order; an international welfare state. In fact it was the virtual 
impossibility of their ever being conditions suitable for the exercise of sovereign autonomy in its 
purest sense that led Friedmann to suggest that sovereignty was a thing of the past; states could 
no longer exist in a sovereign vacuum they needed community, especially the newer and 
developing states.12    
 
Friedmann’s project was more than just a move from process to substance. In the move he was 
able to reassert a new status for international law. It was not just a law of prohibitions (that could 
not be enforced) but also a law of positive obligations and benefits that could be pragmatically 
implemented through rhetoric and practice. The "reality" of international law was evidenced in 
its ability to structure the discourse of nations and to channel the community of interest - in the 
new substantive law even more so.13 International law became more than a sanction or penal 
statute, it was now a facilitator of communal action.  
 
(b) The Move and Universality 
 
 
     12 FRIEDMANN, CSIL, Chapter 3. 
     13 FRIEDMANN, CSIL, Chapter 8. 
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In essence Friedmann’s was a project in explaining how the apparent universality of international 
law would survive the move from process to substance.  
 
From the Peace of Westphalia until the late twentieth century the law of nations, although in a 
phase of sovereign autonomy, exhibited a universality. This was a universality of coexistence or 
process. He explained14: 
 
 "The principal preoccupation of the classical international law ..was the formalization 
and the establishment of generally acceptable rules of conduct in international 
diplomacy... mainly concerned with the adjustment of territorial sovereignties, the legal 
status of the high seas, the diplomatic and jurisdictional immunities of states, heads of 
government and diplomatic representatives, ... recognition ... , the protection of subjects .. 
and the regulation of war and neutrality".   
 
This procedural system did not seek to regulate the internal ordering of states; a product of the 
fact that before the rise of democracy and liberalism states were governed by absolutist rulers.15. 
 Rather the system  sought to coordinate the territorial blocks16 known as states.  In its operation, 
the procedural system had an air of universality as it was apparently a neutral system of law, not 
 
     14 FRIEDMANN, CSIL, 5. 
     15 FRIEDMANN, CSIL, at 5.  
     16 On this notion see: ANTHONY CARTY, THE DECAY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
Chapter 4 (1986); ANTHONY ANGHIE, CREATING THE NATION STATE: 
COLONIALISM AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 87ff (SJD Dissertation 
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assessing or interfering with the interests of each nation but merely coordinating their diplomatic 
interaction. 
 
The universality of process had been guaranteed by at least two things:  
  
 1)  the fact that it was implemented and practiced and created by the Club of Europe - 
Western European Nations having Christian religious values and  
 2)  it was a law of coordination not substance; it did not seek to interfere with internal 
ordering in any substantial way.17
 
In moving to a law of cooperation the internal structure of the state was very much open to 
assessment. At bottom the law of cooperation was not a law governing states but the citizens of 
the world, and as the citizens of the world lived very different lives the points of reconciliation 
would be difficult to find. 
 
Friedmann earmarked three types of difference: religious, economic and ideological.18 These 
would be barriers to a universal law of cooperation. But even then he hoped that in the space of 
Harvard Law School, 1995); John G. Ruggie Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing 
Modernity in International Relations 47 INT. ORG. 139 (1993). 
     17 FRIEDMANN, CSIL, 5-6. 
     18 FRIEDMANN, CSIL, at 6-8. For a current debate over the nature of difference see: Samuel 
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations Foreign Affairs (1993) Chen Zhou, Divergence of 
Cultures: the Principal Root Cause of Modern Worlds's Conflict and War? - Huntington's "The 
Clash Of Civilizations" (1995). 
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difference moments of agreement would be located - perhaps through his loose pragmatic/ 
rhetorical practice of international law. For example in the area of human rights difference could 
dissolve through interpretation of the norm and in this way law was doing its job by providing a 
standard from which agreement could be generated.19
 
For Friedmann it was obvious that regional groupings of like minded states might reach the holy 
grail of cooperation before states of diverging economy, religiosity and ideology.20 The 
European Community was his prime example - those states had moved from process to 
substance primarily due to ideological, economic and religious similarity.    
 
In Changing Dimensions of International Law21 he quoted, Reuter22,  who had made the 
distinction between coexistence and cooperation suggesting the latter was more likely between 
states with "a similar culture, internal structure and economic and social philosophies".  This 
motivated Friedmann to call for the "conception of international law as a stratified structure"23, 
of universality: 
 
 "[C]ooperation proceeds today on different levels of universality, depending on the 
extent of the common interests and the values that bind the participants. Certain types of 
the new international law are developing today on the universal level, because they 
 
     19 CSIL, Chapter 5 especially at 55-7; cf  63. 
     20 CSIL, at 62-3. 
     21 62 COLUMBIA LR 1147 (1962); CSIL, 65.  
     22 INSTITUTIONS INTERNATIONALES, 133 (2nd ed 1956) 
     23 CSIL, 58. 
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reflect universal interests of mankind. Others depending on a more closely knit 
community of values and purposes proceed on a more restricted level ...changing with 
different political configurations"24
 
 "International Law can no longer be regarded as one body of principles, rather it is a 
general description of various patterns and levels of international relations, which are 
only to a limited extent governed by the same principles."25
 
The Friedmann project then was aimed at facilitating the move from process to substance, whilst 
acknowledging that universality would expand and contract relative to the existing community of 
interest. While he suggested that universality would be stronger amongst likeminded states he 
did not ignore the possibility of universal substantive norms amongst "differently" minded states, 
which is in large part the subject of this article.  Friedmann's work is foundational to this article 
in that it describes a unique area of international law, substantive international law, and 
highlights how this type of law battles with sovereign autonomy in constructing universal norms.  
  
While Friedmann's work heavily influenced his Columbia Law School colleagues, they did little 
to expand his notion of universality. It was not until the arrival of Anne Marie Slaughter's work 
on "law amongst liberal nations" that the issue of universality was given new consideration. 
 
(ii) The Post Cold War Euphoria Over Democratic Governance: A Segmented Universality 
 
     24 CSIL, 62. 
     25 CSIL, 367. 
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Writing a quarter of a century later in an exuberant environment of post cold war relief and 
liberation Anne Marie Slaughter has argued that liberal states interact amongst each other in 
international relations in a much deeper and more substantive way than they do with non liberal 
states26. For Slaughter continuation of the progress narrative in post cold war America has meant 
a search for a more expanded yet segmented/regional notion of universality; although she 
appears unwilling to declare it is a theory of universality. 
 
Her aim is to show that universality can be achieved (in coexistence or cooperation she does not 
really distinguish between them) amongst liberal states with much more strength than amongst 
other or non liberal states. Slaughter's work does much to illuminate the arguments that 
Friedmann initiated in the early 1960's. She in essence fills out that part of Friedmann’s theory 
which suggested universality would be stronger where a community of interest existed. In doing 
this Slaughter helps our understanding of the creation of universal norms amongst 
likeminded/liberal states, in such provocative fashion, that one is immediately drawn to inquire 
how universal norms amongst all states are created.  
 
Slaughter while exciting and thorough in her analysis purposefully tells us only half the story; the 
story of law amongst liberal states; the story of one segment or layer of universality. Friedmann 
 
     26 AM Slaughter, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State 
Doctrine 92 COLUMBIA LR 1907 (1992); International law and International Relations 
Theory 87 AJIL 205 (1993); The Liberal Agenda for Peace: International Relations Theory and 
the UN  4  JNL of TRANS L & COM PROB 377 (1994); International Law in a World of 
Liberal States 6 EJIL 1 (1995) 
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though envisaged a layer (even if only very weak) of universality amongst a majority if not all 
the nations in the world. Recent developments in the international protection of intellectual 
property suggest the existence of substantive norms of international law which are accepted by 
states of all different complexions. This is the point that I wish to pursue: how do we achieve 
universal norms of substantive international law in segments/layers/sectors containing more than 
just liberal states?   
 
The novelty of Slaughter’s approach is in its invocation of international relations theory.  She 
attributes her ability to analyze the cooperative framework of law amongst liberal states to 
international relations theory and in particular the emergence of  a liberal theory of international 
relations:"international relations theorists have a comparative advantage in formulating 
generalizable hypotheses about  state behavior and in conceptualizing the basic architecture of 
the international system"27.   
 
International relations was formerly preoccupied with realism moved through regime theory and 
is now at the point where it is starting to consider the internal structuring of states - liberal theory. 
Realism, focusing on power and hegemony in an anarchical society, is vigorously challenged by 
liberalism. Liberalism suggests that state action cannot be understood without first appreciating 
the domestic structure of states - whether they are democratic or non democratic: "liberal 
international relations theory focuses on state preferences - the individual foreign policy goals .. 
it assumes that the primary determinants of state behavior are not external factors .. but the nature 
 
     27 AM Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States 6 EJIL 1,2 (1995) 
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of the goals .. themselves"28; "the primary actors in the international system are individuals and 
groups acting in domestic and transnational civil society .. the nature of domestic representation 
is the decisive link between societal demands and state policy"29.   
 
This raises the very interesting issue of whether universality is possible amongst states with very 
different internal structures. It does not seem that Slaughter would necessarily deny the 
possibility of such universality, although her approach raises serious doubts about the strength of 
such a universality, an issue to which we shall return below. 
 
Having introduced in accord with Kennedy's framework the distinct notion of substantive 
international law and examined the allied concept of universality it is now possible to move 
deeper into the question of how substantive norms can be constructed in the face of difference. 
 
PART II: RECONCILING DIFFERENCE IN A DIVIDED WORLD 
 
A deeper understanding of substantive norms of international law is acquired through examining 
the principles and projects/structures of international jurisprudence and legal regulation. In 
essence the backdrop for this article is the story of the different principles of, and projects 
pursued by, public international law and international trade law. It is through an understanding of 
these different principles and projects that one can better appreciate the emerging framework for 
universalizing substantive norms.  
 
     28 AM Slaughter, The Liberal Agenda for Peace: International Relations Theory and the UN, 4 
JNL of TRANS L & COM PROB 377, 390 (1994) 
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(i) The Distinct Principles and Projects of Public International Law and International 
Trade Law  
 
The modern international legal system revolves around two principles: trade and peace/war. 
Trade is a principle of discourse (a pathway) that allows nations to move their persona (primarily 
for commerce and inherently for survival) beyond the territorial blocks that they inhabit.30 In this 
sense trade is a moving or transnational principle while much else of public international law is 
concerned with how the territorial block is to be regulated which may in turn have indirect 
effects on the outside world (as the principle of peace suggests). The trade principle is concerned 
with the metaphysical nation in movement, the peace side of things with actions in and against 
                                        
     29 AM Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States 6 EJIL 1,6 (1995)  
     30 At an abstract level it can be said that international law in the realm of substance revolves 
around two principles. Firstly is the principle of harmonization, which requires countries to 
"regulate" their territorial domains in accord with each other to facilitate peace in pursuit of some 
good that is supposed to benefit all nations. Secondly is the principle of movement/trade which 
requires that the channels of interaction through trade be clear so as to allow countries to speak to 
one another, to move forward and touch one another, in the area of commerce; for if one cannot 
speak to another failure in commerce and ultimately survival is guaranteed. In the latter 
dimension "movement" is the metaphor in the former dimension "static" is the metaphor. This is 
perhaps why trade is so powerful in pulling countries together: it is really a principle of discourse 
that allows nations to move there persona (primarily for commerce) beyond the territorial blocks 
that they inhabit. Consider: Wolfgang Fikentscher GATT Principles and Intellectual Property 
Protection at 121 in FRIEDRICH-KARL BEIER and GERHARD SCHRICKER (eds.) GATT 
OR WIPO (1988). 
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the territorial block. However as the world moves closer together through things like technology 
issues of movement are more likely to be entwined with issues of territorial governance. 
  
Due to the fundamentally different natures of the two core principles of trade and peace, the 
international law projects they instigate are very different. In the realm of peace (public 
international law), the substantive international law project is one of regulating the sovereign 
difference that emanates from territorial sovereignty, of managing the antinomies - in search of 
common accord.31 In the realm of trade (international trade law) the project is much different. 
Here the starting point is a nebulous common accord, that of wealth maximization32 and the need 
 
     31 The tradition of public international law is to view law as a regulatory framework through 
which to mediate difference; to facilitate sovereign interaction. The project of public 
international law is one of regulating sovereignties and thus the closer one gets to world 
governance through the United Nations the closer the project is to completion. Today the project 
of public international law is embodied in the edifice of the United Nations, in terms such as 
compliance, resolution, peace etc - the words of regulating sovereignties. But the project of 
regulating sovereignties is so very difficult and the more one moves from simple international 
law principles of coexistence to cooperation the regulatory framework is given indifferent 
respect by states.  
 
     32 "[O]verall the Agreement constitutes the prevailing norm of international trade among 
member states": AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 265 (1987); JOHN H. JACKSON, 
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 8-14 (1989) (hereafter "WTS"); 
MICHAEL TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE Chapter 1 (1995); CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 17-21, 27, 33 (5th ed 1973); PAUL R KRUGMAN and 
MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY (3rd ed 
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to trade to survive (or to move and communicate in commerce), which the project is designed to 
facilitate. In one instance (peace) then we are heading towards a common accord through 
regulation (to overcome sovereign difference), quite often without success, while in the other 
case (trade) we have common accord and are regulating to deregulate33, to prosper the common 
accord, to open up the pathway (to wealth maximization and survival).34 While the common 
1994);  JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM (1988); RONALD W. JONES and 
ANNE O. KRUEGER eds. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
(1990); John G. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order 36 INT. ORG. 379 (1982).  
     33 W Ropke, Economic Order and International Law 86 RECUEIL DES COURS 203 (1954 
II) 
   34 For an introduction to the different cultures of the internationals see: David Kennedy, 
Receiving the International, 10 CONNECTICUT JNL. INT. LAW 1, 10-20 (1994) (hereafter 
"Receiving the International"); David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and 
Policy, UTAH LR 7 (1994) especially at 8-17, 62-3 (1994) (hereafter "International Style"). For 
Jackson's response see: International Economic Law: Reflections on the "Boilerroom" of 
International Relations, 10 AMERICAN UNIV. JNL. INT'L. LAW and POLICY 595, 596 
(1995).See also Michael Gadbaw and Rosemary E. Gwynn, Intellectual Property Rights in the 
New GATT Round 42-43, 46-47 in GADBAW and RICHARDS (eds) infra n. 72.  On the issue 
of developing countries and GATT see: JACKSON, WTS, 275-281; JACKSON, LPIER, 
Chapter 24. The two systems stand apart, one public aiming for a common regulatory point, the 
other private, motivated by common accord and striving for exploitation of that accord through 
deregulation [Consider: Wolfgang Fikentscher supra n at 121; herein lies the threads of a 
public/private distinction, on which see: NORBERTO BOBBIO, DEMOCRACY AND 
DICTATORSHIP 1-21 (trans. Peter Kennealy, 1989); Joel  R. Paul The Isolation of Private 
International Law 7 WIS. INT'L LJ 149; Kennedy, International Style, 12-13; Karen Engle 
Views from the Margins: A Response to David Kennedy 7 UTAH LAW REVIEW 105 (1994)]. 
They both serve to alter sovereign capacity but from different starting points, for different 
reasons and in pursuit of different end points.  
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accord in the latter project is problematic due to its definitional35 and ideological36 inexactitude, 
 
 
     35 The inexact guiding premise calls for: "[T]he substantial reduction of tariffs and other 
barriers to trade and .. the elimination of discriminating treatment in international commerce": 
Preface of GATT. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF 
GATT, Part II, (1969) (hereafter "WTLG"); JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY, 
ALAN O. SYKES, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 
Chapters 8-11 (3RD ED. 1995) (hereafter "LPIER"); JACKSON, WTS, Chapters 5-11; MARK 
W JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, 283-287 (2nd ed 1993).   
     36 The principle of comparative advantage is open to many criticisms: for a public choice 
perspective see: Paul B. Stephan III, Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice Theory and 
International Economic Law 10 AMERICAN UNIV. JNL. INT'L. LAW and POLICY 745 
(1995). See further: Jagdish Bhagwati, Challenges to the Doctrine of Free Trade 25 N.Y.U. J. 
INT'L & POLICY 219 (1993); Arjun Appadurai, Disjunction and Difference in the Global 
Cultural Economy 2 PUBLIC CULTURE 1 (1990); COOPER, B. EICHENGREEN, C.R. 
HENNING, G. HOLTHAM, R. PUTNAM, CAN NATIONS AGREE? (1989); DAVID Z. 
RICH, THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1992); PAUL KRUGMAN, 
DEVELOPMENT, GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMIC THEORY (1995); PAUL KRUGMAN, 
POP INTERNATIONALISM (1996); Robert O. Keohane, Theory of Hegemonic Stability and 
Changes in International Economic Regimes 1967-1977, in O.R. HOLSTRI, R.M. SIVERSON, 
A.L. GEORGE (eds.) CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, 131-162; Stephen D. 
Krasner, State Power and the Structure of International Trade 28 WORLD POLITICS 317 
(1976); Duncan Snidal The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory 39 INT. ORG. 579 (985); 
DAVID A. LAKE, POWER, PROTECTION, AND FREE TRADE:INTERNATIONAL 
SOURCES OF US COMMERCIAL STRATEGY, 1887-1939, (1988); J.A.C. Conybeare Tariff 
Protection in Developed and Developing Countries: A Cross Sectional and Longitudinal 
Analysis 37 INT. ORG. 441 (1983); Edward D. Mansfield and Marc L. Busch, The Political 
Economy of Nontarriff Barriers: A Cross-National Analysis 49 INT. ORG. 723 (1995); Isabelle 
Grunberg Exploring the "Myth" of Hegemonic Stability 44 INT. ORG. 431 (1990); Timothy J. 
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it nevertheless acts as a popular foundation to a massive trade regime. It appears as the one true 
universal principle of substantive international law. And while we may question the morality or 
efficiency of comparative advantage, the trade principle seems more than that: it is a principle of 
discourse that all countries seek for survival. The essence of universality, then, may lie not so 
much in the notion of comparative advantage, but in the need to survive, to speak to other 
countries in commerce through open channels of communication.  
 
The interesting issue thrown up by recent events is whether the trade regime (which exudes a 
universality), can, or inevitably will, be substituted for, the public international regime (which 
struggles to achieve accord) to produce a dynamic new framework for universalizing substantive 
international law. In other words is the universalizing strength of the trade regime the key to 
universalizing substantive international law? Recent developments in international trade law 
suggest a positive, yet largely unproven, answer.     
 
a) The International Law Principles and Projects Coalesce in GATT/WTO 
 
The Uruguay Round of the GATT, has seen a joining of the two principles and projects of 
international law in the one regime. In the new World Trade Organization (WTO) charter (which 
McKeown, Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe 37 INT. ORG. 
73 (1983); Fred H. Lawson, Hegemony and the Structure of International Trade Reassessed: A 
View from Arabia 37 INT. ORG. 317 (1983); Joanne Gowa, Democratic States and International 
Disputes 49 INT. ORG. 511 at 519-521 (1995); Peter J. Katzenstein, International Relations and 
Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States INT. ORG. 1 
(1976)  
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incorporates GATT) the core principle of trade is combined with the regulation of substantive 
issues such as intellectual property - Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property (TRIPS) - which would have formerly been regulated under the traditional public 
international law regime (as aspects of peace). This combination (of trade and peace) suggests a 
new framework through which to construct substantive international law.  
 
The Uruguay Round of the GATT has presented us with a trade structure that no longer seeks 
only to deregulate/regulate in the name of some narrow universal principle of free trade but that 
seeks to regulate sovereignties for the purpose of finding universality which in an attenuated 
sense is then claimed to facilitate and reinforce the core principle. To get to this point the trade 
regime through the notion of packaging universalizes the norms attached to the core principle. It 
starts with the basic premise that every state in the world wants: to maximize wealth, and builds 
outward through substantive extensions. But will the marrying of trade and peace and their 
ensuing projects be a success? That is in essence the question I wish to answer in this article.  
 
Vital to such an analysis is an understanding of the fact that the movement of the trade regime 
into the business of regulating national cultures, of managing sovereign difference (formerly the 
project of public international law), has occurred through the mechanism of appendage, 
packaging and linkage. To this end, this article is designed to establish the conditions needed for 
such appendage or linkage and to find out when and why this packaging of trade and peace (read 
culture) in a process of universalizing substantive international law, is effective. Throughout my 
focus is on GATT/WTO and its embracing of intellectual property, with supplementary 
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references to the European Community and its dilemma over human rights37 and NAFTA38 and 
its handling of environmental concerns. 
 
PART III: THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE BASED CONSTITUTIONALISMS: 
GATT 
 
In further analyzing the potential of international trade law to provide a universalizing 
framework, it is necessary to consider more closely the development of the trade regime up to the 
point where it has embraced substantive issues of intellectual property law, in what is starting to 
resemble a constitutionalism39 as opposed to a mere international agreement. 
 
     37 See by way of introduction: J.H.H. Weiler and Nicolas J. Lockhart, "Taking Rights 
Seriously" Seriously: The European Court and Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence 32 
COMMON MARKET L. REV. 51, 579 (1995). 
     38 Symposium: NAFTA at Age One: A Blueprint for Hemispheric Integration 10 
CONNECTICUT JNL. INT'L. L. (1995)  
     39 See footnote 3. On the core constitutional principles of GATT see: Wolfgang Fikentscher 
GATT Principles and Intellectual Property Protection 113-119 in FRIEDRICH-KARL BEIER 
and GERHARD SCHRICKER (eds.) GATT OR WIPO (1988) invoking a notion of static and 
dynamic principles. See also George Scwharzenberger The Principles and Standards of 
International Economic Law 117 RECUEIL DES COURS 1-98 (1966); ERNST-ULRICH 
PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC 
FOREIGN TRADE LAW AND FOREIGN TRADE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1991). Contrast European case law that suggest GATT does not have direct effect for the 
purpose of providing justiciable rights under ART 177 TEEC: International Fruit Co. v 
Produktschap [1972] ECR 1219 para 27; FEDIOL v Commission [1989] ECR 1781 paras 18-20; 
Germany v Council (Bananas Case) [1994] ECR I-4973 paras 106, 110-11, although this view 
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i) The WTO/GATT: An Outline 
 
a) History 
 
Throughout the development of international society, trade has been a constant theme. Trade has 
been a discourse along with war molding international society. Without these two principles of 
"greed" and "domination" international society would have been redundant. After the mapping of 
states and the territorialization of the world, trade has become a metaphor for the movement and 
flow of transnational events.   
 
Trade appears as the one true universal substantive principle of the modern era and this seems to 
explain the rise of GATT from the ashes of the crippling trade wars of the early twentieth 
century, where closing the channels of discourse lead to difficulties and resentment and 
ultimately war. GATT was given impetus by the trade wars of the 1930's and the tragedy of 
World War II.40 These events seen as repugnant, states, led by the USA rallied to gather support 
for an international trade regime. GATT was by no means the first trade agreement between 
nations,41 but has become a formidable multilateral edifice.42
will be surley questioned in light of the strengthened and compulsory dispute settlement process 
of the WTO.   
     40 JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 35-57 (1969); JOHN 
H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 9-17 (1990) (hereafter "RGS"). 
     41 JACKSON, WTLG, Chapter 11.  
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The guiding premise of GATT was that "liberal trade and other freedoms for economic 
transactions would best promote the welfare of all the world, based on the well established 
economic theories of comparative advantage, gains from trade and economies of scale".43 To this 
end GATT rose to control tariff and non tariff barriers to trade, and to mandate most favored 
nation (MFN) and national treatment.44
 
 
b) Development 
 
                                        
     42 On the general themes that underpin GATT, NAFTA and the EC, see: MICHAEL 
TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
Chapter 2 (1995). 
     43 John H Jackson, Dolphins and Hormones: GATT and the Legal Environment for 
International Trade After the Uruguay Round, 14 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 429, 441; JOHN 
H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 8 ff. (1989); JOHN H. JACKSON, 
WILLIAM J. DAVEY, ALAN O. SYKES, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 7 ff. (3RD ED. 1995). 
     44 JACSKSON, WTLG, 194; Jan Tumlir, GATT Rules and Community Law - A Comparison of 
Economics and Legal Functions 1-10, in M HILF, FG JACOBS, EU PETERSMANN, THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT in Studies in Transnational Economic Law v 4 
(1986) 
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GATT, a conglomeration of over 200 treaties, while not an organization became a substitute for 
one after the failure of the USA to support the International Trade Organization.45 GATT 
Conferences or Rounds were held periodically and through these the momentum and definition 
of free trade continued to expand.46 It has been the recently concluded Uruguay Round (1986-
1994) though, that has given the GATT system its greatest leap forward since inception. 
 
c) Uruguay Round and the new WTO Charter 
 
The Uruguay Round led to the birth of the World Trade Organization and a treaty package that 
promised to solve many of the "birth defects"47 of GATT. The package consists of the WTO 
charter which includes four annexes. The first and second annexes are of particular relevance to 
this article. Annex 1A contains the GATT as amended to 1994, Annex 1B contains GATS, the 
extension of the trade regime to services, Annex 1C concerns Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPS), and Annex 2 contains an obligatory and unitary dispute settlement 
process.   
 
 
     45 JACKSON, WTLG, Chapter 2; JACKSON, LPIEL, 293-296; WILLIAM DIEBOLD, THE 
END OF THE ITO (1952)  
     46 See JACKSON, LPIEL, 289-301; ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL 
SYSTEM, 7-9, 11-15 (1993) (hereafter "EITL"). 
     47 JACKSON, LPIEL, 296, including the lack of an official organizational structure, and the 
provisional status of GATT, on which see Protocol of Provisional Application of the GATT, 55 
UNTS 308 (1947). 
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The WTO agreement establishes the GATT as a fully fledged treaty48 (with members) and 
redesigns the organizational processes (e.g membership, decisionmaking).49 Of particular 
interest is the new dispute settlement structure employed in the WTO charter.50 Under the old 
regime, disputes were considered pursuant to GATT Art XXIII, by a panel of three experts, and 
the report then submitted to the GATT Council for adoption.51 As the GATT system (in practice) 
worked according to consensus decisionmaking a member state who was the subject of an 
unfavorable panel report could in theory "block" the adoption of the panel report.52
 
The WTO charter changed all of this by confirming the trade regime's movement from a "power" 
oriented to "rule" oriented dispute resolution procedure.53  The new procedure provides for: 
 
     48 On the constitutional validity of the WTO agreement see: Bruce Ackerman and David 
Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional? 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking 
Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation 
108 HARV L. REV 1221 (1995). 
     49 JACKSON, LPIEL, 301-313; Thomas J. Dillon, The World Trade Organization: A New 
Legal Order for World Trade 16 MICHIGAN JNL. INT'L LAW (1995) 
 
     50 See generally: Alec Stone, The New GATT: Dispute Resolution and the Judicialisation of the 
Trade Regime. (Paper delivered at the International Law and International Relations Seminar, 
Harvard Law School, Fall 1995); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations 
Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization 44 DUKE L. J. 829. (1995) 
 
     51 JACKSON, WTS, 94-97.  
     52 JACKSON, LPIEL, 342-3. 
     53 On the distinction between "power" oriented and "rule" oriented dispute resolution see: 
JACKSON, WTS, 85-88; cf HUDEC, EITL, 364-5; ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL 
SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (2nd ed 1990).   
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a) consultation, optional conciliation or mediation, if these fail 
 
b) the dispute moves on to a panel hearing, the panel reports its finding to the Dispute Settlement 
Body (i.e. the General Council) in a procedure which assumes adoption unless there is a 
consensus against adoption (reverse consensus)  
 
c) any party to the dispute can appeal to the Appellate Body, whose report is adopted unless 
overturned by reverse consensus 
 
d) if the report is adopted, its implementation is monitored, and if the situation is not remedied, 
automatic suspension of concessions or a claim for compensation will arise54. 
 
In making it possible though not desirable55 for automatic retaliation procedures in the new 
dispute resolution system the trade regime has bowed to the practice of the USA and EEC who 
had prior to 1994 unilaterally invoked trade retaliation measures.56   
Importantly though retaliatory measures can be exacted in relation to any concession, they do not 
have to be related in any way to the dispute at hand. This is a powerful enforcement mechanism 
 
     54 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (hereafter 
"DSU") Arts. 1-19, JACKSON, LPIEL, 340-44. On its application to TRIPS: see DSU Appendix 
1;  
     55 DSU, Art 22. 
     56 Section 301 Trade Act 1974; Council Regulation (EEC) 2641/84; JACKSON, WTS, 103-9; 
HUDEC, EITL, 43. 
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particularly against a developing country that breaches obligations under TRIPS but has no 
reciprocal industry to be affected by retaliation. Further enforcement of the trade regime depends 
on transparency and monitoring (e.g. in TRIPS).57  
 
d) Uruguay and the Addition of Substance: TRIPS58
 
The new WTO charter not only reinvigorated the GATT regime but also tied intellectual 
property rights to the trade regime. Intellectual property rights (copyright, patent and trademarks) 
had been the subject of (traditional public) international law conventions (known as the "Great 
Conventions") since the late 19th century.59  Aspects of these Conventions however were not 
 
     57 JACKSON, WTS, 113; Abram Chayes and Antonio H. Chayes Compliance Without 
Enforcement: State Behavior Under Regulatory Treaties 7 Negotiation L. J. 311 (1991); Abram 
Chayes and Antonio H. Chayes, On Compliance 47 INT. ORG. 175 (1993); ABRAM CHAYES 
and ANTONIO H. CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY (1995); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, 
Institutional Misfits: The GATT, the ICJ, and Trade-Environment Disputes 15 MICHIGAN JNL 
INT'L LAW (1994) 
     58 See generally: David Nimmer, The End of Copyright 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385 (1995); 
Michael L. Doane TRIPS and International Intellectual Property Protection in an Age of 
Advancing Technology 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 465 (1994); David Nimmer, GATT's 
Entertainment: Before and NAFTA 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. J. 133 (1995) (hereafter "GATT's 
Entertainment") 
     59 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883) (hereafter "Paris 
Convention"); Berne Covention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886) 
(hereafter "Berne Convention"). For a comprehensive account of the Berne Convention see: 
STANFORTH RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986 (1987); on the Paris Convention see: A. 
Bogsch, The First Hundred Years of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
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acceptable especially to developing countries60 and thus compliance and enforceability were 
frustrated.61  
 
The solution was to append an intellectual property regime to the GATT in the form of Annexure 
1C: Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). As far as copyright is concerned 
TRIPS works to incorporate the Berne Convention (excepting moral rights) into the WTO 
structure.62 As the Berne Convention was a harmonization treaty the concern in relation to 
copyright was not so much raising the level of protection provided by that treaty but rather the 
level of compliance with that treaty.63 That required two things: convincing countries not party 
to Berne (especially those where copyright infringements might occur e.g. Singapore, Korea, 
Taiwan) to become part of the Union, and implementing a sophisticated monitoring system to 
Property  INDUS. PROP. 191 (1983), S.P. LADAS. PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND 
RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (1975). 
     60 Consider: Kenneth Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World 22 VAND. J. 
TRANSNATL. L. 689 (1989); GEORGE R STEWART, MYRA J. TAWFIK, MAUREEN 
IRISH (eds.) INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Chapters 9 
and 10 (1994). 
     61 Frank Emmert, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round - Negotiating Strategies of the 
Western Industrialized Countries, 11 MICH. J. INT'L, L. 1317, 1338 ff. (1990); Kurt Chang, 
Super 301 and Taiwan: A Case Study of Protecting U.S. Intellectual Property in Foreign 
Countries 15 NORTHWESTERN JNL INT'L LAW and BUSINESS 206, 213 (1995); Nimmer, 
GATT's Entertainment, supra n 58, at 135. 
 
     62 See TRIPS, Arts 2, 3, 9. 
     63 Emmert supra n. 61, at 1340 ff; Nimmer, GATT's Entertainment, supra n 58, 144ff. TRIPS 
however does alter the Berne commitments in a distinct way by introducing a Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) obligation into international copyright obligations: TRIPS, Art 4, Nimmer, 145. 
 31
 
 
 
                    
facilitate compliance.64 Issues of protection lying outside the Berne Convention such as rental, 
performers, producers and broadcasters rights are also covered by TRIPS.65 The TRIPS 
agreement is interesting then in that it: 
 
 1) unifies membership of Berne 
 2) extends the protection of Berne 
 3) installs transparent and enforceable compliance mechanisms.   
 
In relation to patents, TRIPS needed to do more as the Paris Convention was not a harmonization 
treaty, it merely secured national treatment i.e. the same protection of foreign patents as that 
given to domestic patents.66 But this type of protection was contingent upon the country in issue 
having patent protection, if it did not then the Paris Convention was useless. This left patent 
protection (including subject matter, life and compulsory licensing) at the mercy of each member 
state.67 As well there were major players who were not party to the Paris Convention - India, 
Singapore, Taiwan - and it was vital to have them as part of the international regime for the 
protection of patents. To remedy this situation TRIPS harmonizes patent law in member 
 
     64 TRIPS, PART III on enforcement, PART V on dispute prevention. 
     65 TRIPS, Arts 11-14. 
     66 Paris Convention, Art 2; see further Emmert, supra n 61, 1340; PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 
COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 952-955 
(3rd ed 1993).  
     67 B.S. Chimni, Political Economy of the Uruguay Round of Negotiations: A Perspective 29 
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 135, 148 (1992). 
 32
 
 
 
                    
countries through a basic requirement to provide patent protection for 20 years.68 In relation to 
patents then TRIPS is interesting because it: 
 
 1) harmonizes patent law 
 2) unifies and increases membership in the international regime protecting patents 
 3) installs transparent and enforceable compliance mechanisms.   
   
TRIPS then does much to universalize international intellectual property law, and to implement 
an enforcement mechanism that is not dependant on the consent of states and which has a potent 
deterrent in retaliation. How does it achieve such remarkable results and are they sustainable? 
 
The seeds of an answer (explaining the motivations for aligning with the trade regime) are 
planted by Jackson et al, when they suggest: 
 
 Attempts by the United Sates and other countries to address these issues in WIPO had 
proved unsuccessful, in large part because of the wide divergence of views on intellectual 
property rights in that organization. Moreover in a single issue forum, such as WIPO, 
there was no possibility of securing changes in intellectual property laws in exchange for 
concessions on other trade issues, as there is in GATT.69
 
Likewise are statements by Emmert to the effect that: 
 
     68 See generally TRIPS, Arts 27-34. 
     69 JACKSON, LPIEL, 885. 
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 .. WIPO conventions date back to the 19th century and although they have been revised 
occasionally, they have failed to meet the challenges posed by the increasingly 
interdependent First and Third World with their conflicting interests and to keep up with 
the development of radically different technologies. After futile attempts to negotiate 
improvements within WIPO and faced by rapidly increasing financial losses of western 
IP owners, the Western Industrialized Countries are now disillusioned with WIPO and 
have turned to the GATT.70  
 
(ii) From WIPO into GATT 
 
These statements suggest that the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)71, an arm of 
the United Nations, and part of the traditional public international law structure could not 
adequately solve the problem of intellectual property (especially patent) protection72 for at least 
three reasons; firstly because of the factions amongst member states, secondly because it was a 
"single issue forum" and thirdly because it had weak enforcement powers.  These three reasons 
acted as the primary motivations for the movement from WIPO into GATT.   
 
 
     70 Emmert supra n 61, 1398-9. 
     71 On WIPO see: WIPO, THE FIRST TWENTY FIVE YEARS OF WIPO, (1992). 
     72 See also Michael Gadbaw and Rosemary E. Gwynn, Intellectual Property Rights in the New 
GATT Round 49-52 in R. MICHAEL GADBAW and TIMOTHY J. RICHARDS (eds.), 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 
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a) Voting Blocks, Single Issue Fora and Enforcement Limits 
 
Within WIPO UN style voting blocks persisted making it very difficult for the developed 
countries to set and implement an agenda.73  On the other hand in the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT voting blocks were much more difficult for developing countries to achieve due to self 
interest, the multifarious nature of the negotiations and inexperience in the GATT context.74  
However Professor Chimni has suggested that once the Uruguay Round moved to add the 
substantive topic of intellectual property to the trade regime a "global coalitional strategy" should 
have come to the fore.75 This did not happen as Chimni explains because the developing counties 
succumbed to the "divide and coerce" strategy of the developed countries reinforced by bilateral 
threats of retaliation against (in particular) India and Brazil.76
 
Allied to the notion of voting blocks, is the negotiating framework of the respective institutions. 
WIPO is said to be a single issue fora, while GATT is seen as a multi issue forum in which 
(1988).  Patent protection was a greater problem than copyright protection (GADBAW at 10-11, 
54, 56) and this is reflected in TRIPS agreement substantial improvement in patent law. 
     73 Emmert supra n. 61, at 1343; FRIEDRICH-KARL BEIER and GERHARD SCHRICKER, 
GATT OR WIPO? 25 (1989). 
     74 B.S.Chimni, supra n 67, at 141. "..Third World countries are at weakest inside GATT, in 
terms of collective organization and bargaining. They do not negotiate or bargain collectively 
inside GATT": CHARKRAVARTY RAGHAVAN, RECOLONISATION: GATT, THE 
URUGUAY ROUND AND THE THIRD WORLD, 60, (1990).  
     75 Chimni, supra n. 67, at 141. 
     76 Chimni, supra n 67, at 141-3. 
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compromise and packaging are more likely.77  Thus GATT is seen as a negotiating framework in 
which the "need to speak (trade) freely" is used to temper other demands.  
 
As well the enforcement mechanisms of the Berne and Paris Conventions were seen to be 
ineffective. The Paris Convention was expressly linked to the International Court of Justice but 
the majority of member states never accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ and of those 
that did few were willing to risk diplomatic relations by suit in the World Court.78  Generally, the 
Great Conventions were protected through traditional international law mechanisms (primarily 
the International Court of Justice) which were ineffective due to the ability of states to avoid the 
jurisdiction of international tribunals.79 Exacerbating this was the lack of membership of key 
players such as India, Taiwan and Singapore. Emmert explains, "as long as these problems are 
not addressed by WIPO, the dispute settlement system is effectively worthless"80. 
 
The agenda of WIPO through the 1980's was to achieve that which TRIPS finally achieved in 
1994; harmonization of and compliance with intellectual property laws. WIPO though, was in 
the public international law tradition, seeking to regulate sovereignties enroute to universal 
substantive international law, and its success in doing so was poor. How then did the GATT 
regime succeed in this universalizing process when WIPO could not?  
 
 
     77 FRIEDRICH-KARL BEIER, supra n 73, 25.  
     78 Emmert supra n 61, at 1343; David Nimmer, GATT'S Entertainment supra n 58, at 135 
(1995). 
     79 Nimmer, GATT'S Entertainment, supra n 58, 135.  
     80 Emmert, supra n 61, at 1343. 
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Admittedly, in GATT the starting premise is different, all agree in free trade, because all need to 
trade to survive and more trade hopefully brings more wealth. But one needs to go a long way 
before they can claim the protection of intellectual property within the boundaries of one country 
falls within the international trade paradigm.  
 
Obviously the lack of a developing country "coalitional strategy", a broader negotiating context 
and stronger enforcement measures in the trade regime provided a comfortable setting for TRIPS 
but the real question is as to why and how intellectual property (a peace issue) can be linked to 
the trade regime GATT (in preference to WIPO) and with such (apparent) effectiveness?  The 
linking of intellectual property to international trade is a vital strategy to understand, for it is 
through this action that substantive intellectual property law is removed from the public 
international law project and incorporated into the trade regime. The vital question becomes, 
what makes it possible to incorporate intellectual property protection in the trade regime?  
A short answer (developed below) is that linkage occurs with effectiveness because the trade 
regime brings a new and dynamic perspective to the regulation of intellectual property which 
facilitates the unique nature of such property. 
 
PART IV: LINKING SUBSTANTIVE LAW TO THE TRADE REGIME 
 
(i) The Notion of "Linkage" 
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This moves us to the question of linkage81 (of substantive issues like intellectual property to the 
trade regime), how this comes about, under what conditions and for what reason or 
justification.82 For while it is easy to think of intellectual property as linked to trade it is also 
easy to think of intellectual property as closely linked to culture (peace).83  
 
a) Linkage on the Basis of Free Trade: By Analogy With the Commerce Clause 
 
 
     81 On the notion of linkage see: R.N. Cooper Trade Policy is Foreign Policy 9 FOREIGN 
POLICY 18 (1972-3); E.B Haas, Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes 32 
WORLD POLITICS 357 (1980). 
     82 On the linkage of intellectual property to GATT prior to TRIPS: see, GATT Arts. III (4) and 
XX (d),  Reichman, infra n 91, at 756, 827 ff; JACKSON, WTLG, 511-12, 741-5; William 
Alford, Forum: Taiwan and the GATT: Panel Three: Intellectual Property, Trade and Taiwan: a 
GATT-Fly's View COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 97, 98 (1992) (hereafter "GATT-Fly"). On the 
relationship between, measures designed to secure compliance with domestic intellectual 
property laws, and GATT: see United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Panel 
Report Adopted November 7th 1989, 36th Supp. BISD 345 (1990); United States - Section 337 
of the Tarifff Act of 1930 The Case of Certain Aramid Fibre GATT Panel report Adopted 
November 7th 1989, 36 Supp BISD 345 (1990) . See further GATT Arts. XII:3(c), XVIII:10 
Braga infra n 88, 247-251. 
     83 Jackson, WTS: "Some would have [international economic law] cast a very wide net, and 
embrace almost any aspect of international law that relates to any sort of economic matter. 
Considered this broadly, almost all international law could be called international economic law 
because almost every aspect of international relations touches in one way or another on 
economics." at 21. Consider also Daniel Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of 
International Trade 100 HARV. L. REV. 546 (1987); INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM, 
Intellectual Property Law 27 GEORGE WASHINGTON JNL INT'L LAW and ECONOMICS 
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Linkage in any common endeavor will normally arise in two ways: firstly because the 
component being linked (here intellectual property) is in fact an integral part of the core\cog 
(here international trade) and must be recognized as a natural component, or secondly it may be 
linked to the core activity (trade) due to its impact upon that activity.  
 
This common theory of linkage is manifested when considering, by way of analogy84, 
jurisprudence surrounding Art 1 Cl. 8 (3) Constitution (USA). This clause of the Constitution, 
known as the "commerce clause", was designed to give Congress (at the expense of the states) 
the legislative power to regulate commercial activity in pursuit of a common market in which 
goods could move freely.85 Thus there is much conjecture in interpreting this clause over how far 
ancillary or incidental issues to interstate commerce can be linked to the affirmative power. 
Recently the US Supreme Court has interpreted the commerce clause so as to allow Congress to 
regulate the channels, and instrumentalities of, and people in, interstate trade; and those activities 
that substantially affect interstate commerce.86 The former things/activities, the channels, 
instrumentalities and people are regarded as being part of the core activity of interstate trade and 
 
     84 The commerce clause seems an appropriate analogy as it has worked to underpin the 
common market created by the US federal system of governance. Sections 51 (1) and 92 of the 
Australian Constitution, which codify the commerce clause and its ensuing case law: Cole v 
Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360, highlight how the commerce clause has been an integral part in 
constructing the common market of the United States of America. See T SANDALOW and 
ERIC STEIN (eds.) COURTS AND FREE MARKETS: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE 
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (1982).      
     85 JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST Nos. 41, 42; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 403-6 (2nd ed 1988).  
     86 US v Lopez 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1629-30 (1995)  
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thus are understandably open to trade based regulation. The latter activities, activities that 
substantially affect trade, are activities that are linked to trade to justify regulation. It is the 
linkage of these issues to the commerce clause that raises questions similar to those raised in 
justifying linkage of intellectual property to GATT.  
 
To analogize, in international trade the channels and instrumentalities of entry to other nations 
markets are most easily seen as the basis of GATT, especially considered in light of its founding 
purposes: the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers. However when one moves beyond the 
actual flow or exchange of goods in transnational movement, to for example the system of 
property rights protecting intangible goods then the justification for linkage to the trade based 
regime becomes much more vital and as a consequence, closely scrutinised. 
 
The prima facie claim is that intellectual property is apt for regulation in GATT because it 
impacts upon trade.87 As the world has become more complex the notion of "trade barriers" has 
started to expand to cover not just quotas and subsidies but also issues of environmental, labor 
and property regulation that substantially affect trading.88 In essence, and commerce clause 
 
     87 See, William Alford, Intellectual Property in East Asia: How Theory Does - And Does Not - 
Matter: American Approaches To Intellectual Property Law In East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. 
BASIN L.J. 8, 9ff. (1994)  
     88 Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT: 
A View From the South 22 Vand. J. Transnatl. L. 243 (1989), suggests: "Differences among 
national intellectual property systems are tantamount to non tariff barriers to trade insofar as they 
may affect trade in knowledge-intensive products" at 244. 
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jurisprudence bears this out, nearly any regulation could be seen as affecting international trade 
and thus labelled a non tariff barrier to trade.89
   
In summary then, it appears as though linkage of intellectual property to the trade regime is made 
according to a similar principle that governs the commerce clause. This requires the satisfaction 
 
     89 Joel P Trachtman International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction, 
34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 48 (1993); JACKSON LPIEL, 1206-10. There must be a stopping point 
where it would sound silly or unpersuasive to suggest that some domestic activity is a trade 
barrier: by way of analogy see the ECJ's narrowing interpretation of ART 30 in Cinetheque SA v 
Federation nationale des cinemas francais [1986] 1 CMLR 365, and Keck and Mithhouard 
[1993] ECR I 6097, wishing to respect member state's cultural autonomy: consider also Art. 128 
Treaty Establishing the European Community (hereafter "TEEC"). In the EC property rights in 
general (Art. 222 TEEC) and intellectual property rights in particular (Art. 36 TEEC) are seen to 
be so remote from trade that their existence alone, as opposed to their exercise in a supranational 
context, is not regarded as a barrier to trade: see, Centrafarm BV v Sterling Drug Inc [1974] 2 
CMLR 480; GEMA [1981] 2 CMLR 44; EMI Electrola GmbH v Patricia Im-und Export [1989] 
ECR 79;  PAUL CRAIG and GRAINNE DE BURCA, EC LAW: TEXT CASES AND 
MATERIALS, Chapter 23, (1995); Opinion 1/94 [1994] ECR I-5267 paras. 55, 57, 59, 103.  
However intellectual property rights can and have been subject to harmonization measures in the 
EC (Art 100A TEEC): CRAIG, 1062-4; GEORGE A BERMAN, ROGER J GOEBEL, 
WILLIAM J DAVEY, ELEANOR M FOX, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY LAW, 422-427 (1993), Supp 98-99 (1995); Ysolde Gendreau, Copyright 
Harmonisation in the European Union and in North America 20 COLUMBIA J. L. & ARTS 37 
(1995); Paul Waterschoot, An Overview of Recent Developments in Intellectual Property in the 
European Union (Paper delivered at Law School Fordham University, April 11th 1996), which 
in effect draws the question of property rights into the trade regime, not so much as an issue of or 
related to trade, but rather to facilitate trade, but more truthfully because the property regime is 
itself ineffective in generating wealth. 
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of a "substantially affects trade" criterion. In commerce clause jurisprudence this criterion has 
required proof of an economic impact on interstate trade yet recently the court has suggested 
areas of traditional state concern/regulation are less suitable for regulation under the commerce 
clause.90 If one were to follow this principle through to international trade, then it might be said 
that issues of traditional state concern (property rights) should not be regulated on the basis of 
creating free trade.  However the framers of the new trade constitutionalism (WTO), have 
ignored such analogy and included the issue of intellectual property in the trade regime in a hope 
to thwart the "distortion" of trade91 (an economic impact). Therefore the analogy with the 
commerce clause while alerting us to the fact that linkage is a key concept in trade based 
regulation, does not adequately explain why in this case linkage has occurred. For under 
commerce clause jurisprudence this type of regulation would be seen as something too far 
removed from interstate trade to justify regulation; in essence, the problem is with the structure 
and capacity of the property rights regime, which is a distinct and separate concept, having 
impact on trade, but not in itself being a trade/pathway/exchange issue. 
 
The commerce clause analogy could be discounted by international trade lawyers as being a 
unique product of American federalism, where the power to regulate copyright and patents is 
 
     90 Lopez supra n 86 at 1630, 1633-4, 1637-40. This view can be traced back to Marshall CJ's 
initial distinction between the "commerce" and "police" powers: Gibons v Ogden 25 US (12 
Wheat) 419, 443 (1827); TRIBE, supra n. 85, 405-6.  
     91 Jerome Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a 
GATT Connection 22 VAND. J. TRANSNATL. L. 689, 756 (1989). On the notion of “distortion 
of trade” see: Commission v Italy [1980] ECR 1099. 
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held by the federal/national government.92 Such a move though is inherently destablising as the 
commerce clause founds what has been for many years one of the best examples of a common 
market. Thus if the commerce clause does not allow for the regulation of property rights serious 
doubts must arise, from a free trade perspective as to whether the regulation of property rights is 
a free trade issue. It seems by analogy with the commerce clause that free trade is a principle of 
exchange which has little to do with the (legal) creation (as opposed to production) of 
exchangeable products or property rights. The conclusion then is that while a denial of 
intellectual property rights "distorts" trade and is "tantamount to a NTB" the linkage of TRIPS to 
GATT cannot be justified on the basis of free trade. This linkage does much more than free trade, 
its defines the very commodities of trade and in doing so pushes us towards a deeper inquiry into 
linkage.    
 
b) A Deeper Foundation for Linkage: The Principle of Ubiquity 
 
As commerce clause jurisprudence suggests, the regulation of property rights (as opposed to the 
channels of exchange93) is a traditional concern of states and thus something over and above its 
economic impact on international trade must justify linkage.94  
 
This further justification appears to lie in a principle we might call "ubiquity".  The principle of 
ubiquity arises from the intangible and informational (ubiquitous proprietorial) nature of 
 
     92 Art. 1 Cl. 8 (8) Constitution (USA). 
     93 Fikentscher, supra n 30, 121. 
     94 See R. MICHAEL GADBAW and TIMOTHY J. RICHARDS (eds.), INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 3-4, 17, 32 (1988). 
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intellectual property and promises to become even more pervasive with expanded use of the 
internet - a ubiquitous technology. 
 
The substance of intellectual property is a mental thought process (information) manifested in 
tangible form: for example, expression fixed in a tangible medium of expression95, or an 
invention explained in tangible written claims, specifications and drawings.96 The manifestation 
of the information in tangible form, while important for legal protection does not remove the 
ubiquitous properties of the information. In other words while a useful invention may be built, 
this will not prevent the (intangible) thought process behind the invention from being spread 
across the world, as information has no unique, solitary or exact locus, except that which 
transmission dictates. Physical or tangible property on the other hand is wedded to an exact locus 
usually rehearsed in a discourse of territoriality.97  
 
Thus information is a primary example of the principle of ubiquity. This principle of ubiquity 
impacts upon many things, most significantly for the purpose of this article, the construction of a 
property regime (intellectual property) that can drive a market in information; a market that has 
grown rapidly in the last twenty years.   
 
The property regime that is constructed by TRIPS is premised on the notion that the information 
covered by TRIPS is ubiquitous and needs to be protected through an international 
 
     95 17 USC s 102 (Copyright Act of 1976) 
     96 35 USC ss 111-113 (Patent Act)  
     97 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 521-543 (4th 
ed. 1990)  
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harmonization process. It seems then that because traditional public international structural rules 
for protecting property98 (a project of coexistence) have failed to adequately protect ubiquitous 
property the international community has moved to implement substantive norms of intellectual 
property (in an attempt to raise protection of property) through harmonized intellectual property 
laws.99  In essence it is suggested that a state refusing intellectual property protection is 
expropriating foreign intellectual property, which in the realm of physical property is not easily 
undertaken.100 The way to avoid such a surreptitious taking is to ensure all states have 
harmonious intellectual property laws.  
 
 
     98 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW s 712 (1989); BROWNLIE 
supra n 97.  
     99 Reichman supra n 91, 796ff. In the realm of tangible property, the existence of "property" is 
assumed while in case of intangible property, "property" must be established; the former 
therefore is a question for coexistence norms, the latter for cooperation norms.  
 
     100 Reichman supra n 91, at 809-11; Cf. The view that intellectual property is a privilege issued 
at the whim of the sovereign: Reichman supra n 91 at 800; S. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, 15-17 (1938); or the view that 
developing states have a right to exercise "full permanent sovereignty over .. all .. economic 
activities": Art 2 (1), Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 
May 1, 1974 G.A. Res. 3021 (XXIX) (Special) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No 1), U.N. Doc. A/9559 
(1974) reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974) (hereafter NIEO Declaration); see further Declaration 
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among 
sates in Accordance with the Charter of the United nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc A/8028 (1971); Art 1 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).   
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But how has this substantive protection been linked with the trade regime, in preference to the 
traditional public international law regime?  The answer seems tied to the notion of ubiquity and 
movement. The international trade regime is premised on a principle of trade, of movement 
beyond the territorial block. On the other hand the traditional public international law regime has 
focused on action in and against the territorial block. As far as physical property is concerned, its 
unique and exact relationship with territory (situs) has made the structural or coexistence 
principles of public international law the natural mode for its global protection. The nature of 
intangible property though is different. It is ubiquitous and thus less adequately protected 
through the territorial based system of public international law. However the international trade 
regime which facilitates the movement of states presents as a logical mode for protecting 
ubiquitous/ intellectual/informational property. For in a regime premised on states in movement 
(itself somewhat of a ubiquitous concept) it is much easier to attach an international property 
regime for free floating intangible property. The fundamental theme of the trade regime, the need 
to move and communicate in commerce, is extrapolated into a scheme for the international 
protection of intellectual property which itself is premised on the notion of movement, the 
movement of information beyond borders. The core theme speaks to trade beyond borders, the 
appendage, TRIPS, to property spreading beyond borders. While the issues of movement (trade 
and property) are not the same there is at least enough resemblance to find common purpose.  
 
In summary, the trade regime is a logical place to link the regulation of ubiquitous property not 
so much because denial of intellectual property rights distorts trade, but because the trade regime 
is premised on the state in movement, as is an international intellectual property regime. A 
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crucial element of linkage then is the principle of ubiquity which appears to inhabit the trade 
regime and its appendant intellectual property regime.      
           
A vital criterion for future linkage then is ubiquity. While environmental, human, women's, labor 
and other such rights might be seen as transcending national borders101 they lack the essence of 
ubiquity - the possibility of the same right existing everywhere at once - displayed by intellectual 
property. Admittedly, the common themes or perspectives that environmental or humane 
concerns generate world wide create an appearance of ubiquity but this may be little more than a 
mask for a conglomeration of territorial based concerns. If the trade regime were to universalize 
these substantive issues its points of linkage would be shaped differently, perhaps in terms of 
common territorial themes.  Alternatively issues of the environment, gender and human rights 
may be seen to transcend the territorial paradigm to become ubiquitous concepts and thereto be 
apt for appendage to the trade regime.102 Interestingly, the implication of human rights in the 
legal structure of the European Community has not been for this reason. On the contrary in that 
 
     101 Karen Knopp, Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in International Law, 3 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 293 (1993); Robert Malley, 
Jean Manas, Crystal Nix Constructing the State Extra-territoriality: Jurisdictional Discourse the 
National Interest, and Transnational Norms 103 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1273 (1990); E. 
Urbani (ed) TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1994); Lance Compa, 
International Labor Rights and the Sovereignty Question: NAFTA and Guatemala 9 AM. U.J. 
INT'L. L. & POLC'Y 117 (1994).   
 
     102 To some the very notion of cooperation at a substantive international law level might 
suggest the issue in question is ubiquitous: see Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Trade Sanctions 
and the GATT: An Analysis of the Pelly Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices 9 AM. 
U.J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y. 751, 751-55 (1994).  
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situation, human rights have been implied/appended to the trade regime to further the ends of 
economic integration; to make decisions of the European Court of Justice more 
palatable/legitimate for member states with a strong rights tradition103. The Community's social 
policy 104 on the other hand may indicate the beginning of a more ubiquitous notion of human 
rights,105 as may its environmental principles suggest a more ubiquitous approach to 
environmental concerns.106  
 
c) The Value of the Subject Matter to First World Economies 
 
The principle of ubiquity while displaying a deeper notion of linkage does not clearly explain 
more pragmatic reasons for the linkage of intellectual property and trade, which arise from the 
major role intellectual property now plays in economic growth, especially through international 
trade.107
 
     103 JOSEPHINE SHAW, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, 105-109 (1993)  
     104 Community Charter of the Fundmental Social Rights of Workers (1989); Protocol on Social 
Policy annexed to the TEEC; Title VIII TEEC. 
     105 JOSEPHINE SHAW, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, 329-334 (1993); STEPHEN 
WEATHERILL, LAW AND INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, 174-80 (1995). 
Note though the reluctance of the United Kingdom to support the social policy agenda, for 
political/ideological reasons: WEATHERILL, 175ff. 
     106 TEEC, Title XVI, Arts 130r-130t; See also the North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation, which is part of NAFTA. 
     107 Marshall A. Leafler, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New 
Multilateralism 76 IOWA L. REV. 273; Kenneth Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the 
Third World 22 VAND. J. TRANSNATL. L. 689 (1989). 
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For example computer software and much of the modern entertainment industry, informational 
endeavors of recent origin, and being shipped offshore from the USA, are heavily reliant on 
intellectual property rights to secure economic rewards.108  Likewise, patents found massive 
global industries in pharmaceuticals and machinery that are important to economic growth. 
 
The combination of more informational based exports has naturally lead to concern for 
protection of the wealth generated by these products and a pragmatic solution would suggest 
tying property rights to the trade regime. This may be little more than a manifestation of the 
principle of ubiquity.  
 
In summary, the value of intellectual property, especially to the economic growth of the United 
States, has been a key factor in linkage.109  This justification on its own though does not 
adequately explain why the linkage has occurred, much in the same way as distortion of trade 
does not explain (from a constitutional systems) perspective why the intellectual property 
scheme is appended to the trade regime.  
 
d) Both Conventions Require National Treatment 
 
     108 William Alford, Forum: Taiwan and the GATT: Panel Three: Intellectual Property, Trade 
and Taiwan: a GATT-Fly's View COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 97, 98-99 (1992); Kurt Chang, Super 
301 and Taiwan: A Case Study of Protecting U.S. Intellectual Property in Foreign Countries 15 
NORTHWESTERN JNL INT'L LAW and BUSINESS 206, 211 (1995). 
. 
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It might be argued that linkage arises from the common theme of "national treatment". However 
it would seem that the "national treatment" envisaged by GATT (imported goods be equally 
accessible to the market as local goods110) and the Great Conventions (foreign intellectual 
property be protected to the same extent as local intellectual property111) are markedly different, 
reflecting their diverging purposes of creating clear channels of exchange and an intellectual 
property regime.112 The strongest the argument that can be put is that national treatment is used 
in both instances to benefit the foreign object or person.113 Thus this argument based on national 
treatment does not further clarify the issue of linkage. 
 
(ii) Effectiveness 
 
                                        
     109 R. MICHAEL GADBAW and TIMOTHY J. RICHARDS (eds.), INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 3-5 (1988). 
     110 GATT, Arts III, XX; see further JACKSON, LPIEL, 504ff. 
     111 Berne, Art. 5; Paris Art. 2. See further, Reichman supra n.91, at 843-53; Goldstein, supra n 
66, at 952ff;  
   
     112 Compare Fikentscher who suggests, GATT NT has a focus on objects and the Great 
Conventions NT on people: supra n 30, at 122; see further G.E. Evans, The Principle of National 
Treatmentand and the International Protection of Industrial Property [1996] 3 EIPR 149, 156 . 
 
     113 On the other hand the application of a "national treatment" principle concerning aliens and 
their tangible property, through public international law, is quite limited. Here the difference 
seems to be that NT is not prima facie beneficial to the alien: BROWNLIE, supra n. 97, 523-8, 
535-6.  
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Linkage on its own though is only half the story. One must  determine not only how linkage 
occurs but also how one makes effective linkage; for it is only with effective linkage that a 
process of universalizing substantive international can be considered to be of any value. An 
ineffective linkage is worthless. In turn, effectiveness may represent a further justification for 
linkage.  
 
a) North (First/Developed/Industrialized World) - South (Third/Developing/NonIndustrialized 
World) Economics  
 
Threatening the effectiveness of the new TRIPS regime, which has various lead in times up to 
ten years114, are the basic cultural and economic differences of developed and developing 
countries.115  The TRIPS agreement makes little accommodation for the plight of developing 
countries.116  Having developing countries locked into such an impressive regime may seem like 
a massive victory but the question remains as to whether it will work?117
 
     114 TRIPS, Art 65-66. Developed countries must comply by 1 January 1996, developing 
countries and those in transition form a centrally planned to a market economy by 1 January 
2000, least developed countries by 1 January 2006. 
     115 A theoretical issue raised by intangibles like knowledge or expression is the spatial and 
social dimensions of ownership. When does one's right to own knowledge defer to social, 
cultural or geographic considerations: consider, Wendy Gordon A Property Right in 
Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property 102 
YALE L.J. 1533 (1993). 
     116 "Least developed" countries are allowed a ten year transition period, to 1 January 2006: 
TRIPS, Art 66.   
     117 Sang-Hyun Song Seong-Ki Kim, Korea: The Impact of Multilateral Trade Negotiations on 
Intellectual Property Laws in Korea 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 118 (1995); Suresh Kosy, The 
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Prior to TRIPS, developing countries had called for an international intellectual property regime 
that would meet their needs for welfare and development.118 These claims called for a flexible 
Effect of TRIPS on Indian Patent Law: A Pharmaceutical Industry Perspective 1 B.U. J. SCI.& 
TECH. L. 4 (1995); Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89 (1993); Anthony D. Sabatelli and 
J.C. Rasser, Impediments to Global Patent Law Harmonization 22 N. KY. L. REV. 579. (1995); 
David Nimmer, GATT'S Entertainment: Before and NAFTA 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 133 at 135, 
153-4 (1995); Kurt Chang, Super 301 and Taiwan: A Case Study of Protecting U.S. Intellectual 
Property in Foreign Countries 15 NORTHWESTERN JNL INT'L LAW and BUSINESS 206 
(1995); J. Reichman Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement: Introduction to a Scholarly Debate 
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L.363 (1996); Adrian Otten  & Hannu Wager, Compliance with 
TRIPS: The Emerging World View 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 391 (1996); S Oddi, TRIPS 
- Natural Rights and a “Polite Form of Imperialism” 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 415 
(1996); Frederick M. Abbott & David J. Gerber (eds.) PUBLIC POLICY AND GLOBAL 
TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION (1996); Dominique Foray & Christopher Freeman (eds.) 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1993); Hugh Hansen, International 
Copyright: An Unorthodox Analysis 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 579 (1996)l. 
 
     118 See: Jerome Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and 
Risks of a GATT Connection 22 VAND. J. TRANSNATL. L. 689 (1989); Carlos Alberto Primo 
Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT: A View From the South 22 
VAND. J. TRANSNATL. L. 243 (1989); Frank Emmert, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay 
Round - Negotiating Strategies of the Western Industrialized Countries, 11 MICH. J. INT'L, L. 
1317 (1990); B.S. Chimni, Political Economy of the Uruguay Round of Negotiations: A 
Perspective 29 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 135, 148 (1992); Derek Dessler, China's 
Intellectual Property Protection: Prospects for Achieving International Standards 19 
FORDHAN INT'L. L.J. 181; Peter Gakunu, Intellectual Property: Perspective of the Developing 
World 19 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 358 (1989); GEORGE R STEWART, MYRA J. TAWFIK, 
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rather than rigid regime for intellectual property protection. TRIPS contains little flexibility in its 
application to developing countries; in short TRIPS eschews any notion of "equity".119 Some 
commentators even go so far as to suggest that the TRIPS agreement is inefficient and against 
the fundamental principle of trade liberalization.120    
 
MAUREEN IRISH (eds.) INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Chapters 9 and 10 (1994); David Hartridge and Arvind Subramanian, Intellectual Property 
Rights Issues in GATT 22 VANDERBILT JNL TRANSNAT'L L. 893, 908-9 (1989); R. 
MICHAEL GADBAW and TIMOTHY J. RICHARDS (eds.), INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? (1988); ROBERT P. BENKO, 
PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1987); A. Samuel Oddi, The 
International Patent System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth DUKE L.J. 831 
(1987); Marshall A. Leafler, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a 
New Multilateralism 76 IOWA L. REV. 273; Kenneth Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in 
the Third World 22 VAND. J. TRANSNATL. L. 689 (1989); US-Korea and US Taiwan Trade 
Law Issues in Comparative Perspective 11 MICHIGAN JNL. INT'L. L. 273 (1990); United 
Nations General Assembly Resolutions, supra n 100. 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
     119 Hanns Ullrich GATT: Industrial Property Protection, Fair Trade and Development 127, in 
Friedrich-Karl Beier et al (eds.) supra n 30 at 146-159; cf. NIEO Declaration. 
 
     120     120 MICHAEL TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 252-4 (1995). 
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The apparent problem with imposing a rigid and inequitable regime upon the developing 
countries is that it will become unworkable and that the high demands of TRIPS will simply not 
be met due to economic reality.121   
 
More severe problems are likely to occur with patent than copyright issues as TRIPS does little 
more than rehearse the basic provisions of the Berne Convention. Regarding patents however 
TRIPS radically heightens the protection formerly afforded by the Paris Convention and thereby 
creates a greater area for potential dispute. In some countries, for example India, a rigid patent 
regime has formerly been seen as unfair consolidation of first world economic supremacy.122   
 
The fact that their is no appendant antitrust regime also raises problems for competition and 
consequently, positive opportunities for developing countries.123
 
     121 Consider the case of China: William Alford, Forum: Taiwan and the GATT: Panel Three: 
Intellectual Property, Trade and Taiwan: a GATT-Fly's View COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 97 
(1992)W. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENCE (1995); Derek 
Dessler, China's Intellectual Property Protection: Prospects for Achieving International 
Standards 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 181 (1995) 
 
     122 Suresh Kosy, The Effect of TRIPS on Indian Patent Law: A Pharmaceutical Industry 
Perspective 1 B.U. J. SCI.& TECH. L. 4, 36, 46ff. (1995); B.S. Chimni, supra n. 67. 
     123 Consider TRIPS, Arts 8,40,67 noting the distinction between national and international 
approaches to antitrust: Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR 1 para. 3. See further Eleanor 
M. Fox, Market Access, Antitrust, and the World Trading System: En route to TRAMS - Trade 
Related Antitrust Measures  (Paper delivered HLS, Spring 1996); Fikentscher, supra n 30, at 
123-4; J. Reichman Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement: Introduction to a Scholarly Debate 
29 VAND. JN’L TNT’L L. 363 (1996); JOHN O. HALEY & HIROSHI IYORI (eds.) 
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These problem areas though would seem to be quietened by the new dispute resolution 
mechanism set up under the WTO charter.124
 
b) Enforceable Judicial Review 
 
Under this new "judicial review" mechanism (outlined above) member states are bound125 by 
decisions of the Dispute Settlement Body. If they default in carrying out those decisions they can 
be subject to (coercive) retaliation measures across the field of international trade. This in large 
part legitimates the unilateral retaliatory measures pursued by the United States prior to 
ANTITRUST: A NEW INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDY? (1995); Eleanor M. Fox, 
Trade Competition and Intellectual Property - TRIPS and Its Antitrust Counterparts 29 VAND. 
JN’L TRANSNAT’L L. 481 (1996). See for example how the anti competitive exercise of 
intellectual property rights in the EC has been caught under TEEC Arts 85, 86: Radio Telefis 
Eireann v Magill TV Guide Ltd. [1990] ECC 273; Radio Telefis Eireann v European 
Commission [1989] ECR 1141, [1991] 4 CMLR 586, [1995] All ER 416; cf Volvo AB v Erik 
Veng [1988] ECR 6211 at paras 8-9; CRAIG, supra n. 89, 1050-1062; GEORGE A BERMAN, 
ROGER J GOEBEL, WILLIAM J DAVEY, ELEANOR M FOX, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, 828ff (1993)   
     124 TRIPS is covered by the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: see Appendix 1 
     125 Cf. The situation of states in the public international law regime where the primary dispute 
resolution body, the International Court of Justice, relies on the consent (sovereign autonomy) of 
states: Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 36; Fitzgerald supra n. 4. at 260: ".. it 
confirms that in this era of international (or sovereign) community, sovereign autonomy remains 
prominent in upholding the legitimacy of the ICJ as an international judicial institution". 
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TRIPS.126 Arguably these unilateral measures had a moderate to positive effect on intellectual 
property protection127 and there is no reason to believe that the WTO will not be as effective.128
 
However the question remains as to whether a rigid or formal rule of law can substitute for trade 
diplomacy in areas where there is deep cultural and economic difference.129 This ability to 
punish raises the effectiveness calculus and suggests the TRIPS scheme will be a success. A key 
to effectiveness then, will surely be this enforceable dispute mechanism which in its strictest 
application will look more like a domestic constitutionalism than an international tribunal.130       
 
Reinforcing the new dispute resolution system is a detailed educational and monitoring 
program.131 This type of arrangement which builds on recent theories of compliance will build 
 
     126 Supra n. 56. On the relationship between TRIPS and s 301 see: Judith H. Bello and Alan F. 
Holmer, GATT Dispute Settlement Agreement: Internationalization Elimination of Section 301? 
26 INT'L L. 795 (1992); J. Gero and K. Lannan, Tared ansd Innovation: Unilateralism v 
Multilateralism 21 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 81, 94 (1995).  
     127 Kurt Chang, supra n 117, at 210. 
     128 See DSU Art 22. On the virtues of multilateralism see: John G. Ruggie, Multilateralism: the 
anatomy of an institution 46 INT. ORG (1992); Multilateralism Symposium 46 INT. ORG. 561 
(1992); GADBAW supra n 94, at 28-29.  
     129 Cf. GATT Art. XVIII, Part IV; on which see JACKSON, LPIEL, Chapter 24. 
     130 This raises the question of whether the trade constitutionalism suffers from a democracy 
deficit: Patti Goldman, The Democratization of the Development of United States Trade Policy 
27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 607 (1994); Robert Hudec, Circumventing Democracy: The Political 
Morality of Trade Negotiations 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 311 (1993). 
     131 TRIPS, Art 63 and note the role of the Council for TRIPS under Art 68 and 71. 
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structures that require states to justify their actions.132  Standing ahead of this project is an 
enormous educational undertaking through which the massive populations of Asia (e.g. China, 
India) will be inculcated with a culture of copyright and patent protection. The effectiveness of 
educating these (mostly) developing countries in the ethical and legal standards of the first world, 
which do not comport with the economic imperatives of the millions (of poverty stricken) people 
of Asia, appears crucial to the success of TRIPS. Without a successful education program the 
sheer weight of numbers threatens to swamp the vision of TRIPS (and attached dispute 
resolution system).   
 
Overall, while the process seems nigh on hegemonic, it promises to be tremendously effective 
through its potential/ability to extract information on, and justification for, non compliance, and 
to subsequently close off the pathway of trade.  The next ten to twenty years will tell the story of 
the success or failure of TRIPS. While one must be skeptical about its absolute success, the mere 
fact that it exists, appended to the trade regime seems to ensure that departure from the TRIPS 
mandate will only be undertaken with much trepidation. Ironically, though, the premise that 
makes the trade regime so universal, the need to trade to survive, is in many ways negatived by a 
strict intellectual property regime like TRIPS. These inherent tensions suggest that after much 
effort is spent the TRIPS agreement will have to be renegotiated to somewhere closer a mid-way 
point between North and South, the equator.133  Furthermore, the rapidity with which 
 
     132 Chayes, On Compliance supra n 57. 
     133 This in essence is a suggestion that if the culture of intellectual property protection is to 
expand beyond industrialized (or perhaps it is liberal) states, then the points of reconciliation 
must be realistic. International norms that are achievable by only a selection of states will 
 57
 
 
 
                                                                            
informational products are changed makes it unclear how much of TRIPS will be of any 
significance in ten to twenty years. This raises the further question of how much future 
intellectual property law (e.g. law covering the internet) will be incorporated into TRIPS, with 
what speed and ease? This maybe a point at where TRIPS is avoided through its obsolescence.134  
 
c) Trade Domination 
 
Another serious issue of effectiveness is the extent to which the trade based nature of the regime 
will act to reshape the substantive content of intellectual property law.135  
 
The issue becomes important when trade principles which normally underpin the very structure 
they inhabit, threaten to conflict with substantive principles attached to the trade regime.136 In 
generate a segmented universality which will work against a widespread and faithful 
implementation of the norms; a consequence which will cripple the value of TRIPS.   
134
 J Reichman “Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a 
Restructured International Intellecutual Property System” (1995) 13 Cardozo Arts & 
Entertainment L J 475;  J Reichman, “The Know-How Gap in the TRIPS Agreement: Why 
Software Fared Badly, and What are the Solutions?” (1995) 17 Hastings Communications and 
Entertainment L J  767;  
 
     135 Jeffrey L Dunoff, Resolving Trade-Environment Conflicts:The Case for Trading 
Institutions 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 607 (1994); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The 
GATT, the ICJ, and Trade-Environment Disputes 15 MICHIGAN JNL INT'L LAW (1994). 
Some suggest (more generally) the move to an international society "will automatically 
transform political life ... aligning it more closely with the needs of international commercial 
activity": David Kennedy, Receiving the International, supra n 34, at 3. 
     136 Consider the environment and NAFTA: Symposium: NAFTA at Age One: A Blueprint for 
Hemispheric Integration 10 CONNECTICUT JNL. INT'L. L. (1995)  
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relation to the GATT, trade principles have trumped the environment, but that was not a clear 
case of appendage.137 A more interesting example is the implication of human rights into the EC 
legal system by the European Court of Justice. It has been argued with much persuasiveness that 
these implied rights have been suborned in favor of the fundamental trade principles of the 
European Community.138 However this example might be of little value if one perceives the 
implication of fundamental rights by the ECJ to be little more than a way of furthering the 
dictates of economic integration. The example of the environment as appended to NAFTA and 
the TEEC may prove more interesting but as yet there is little indication of what might 
happen.139
 
     137 United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna from Mexico 39th Supp. BISD 155 (1993); 
Jackson, LPIEL, Chapter 12; Abram Chayes and Lawrence Susskind, The Policy Dialogue on 
Trade and the Environment (1995); Possible Recommendations from the CTE to the Second 
WTO Ministerial Meeting (1995); Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Trade Sanctions and the 
GATT: An Analysis of the Pelly Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices 9 AM. U.J. 
INT'L. L. & POL'Y. 751 (1994). 
     138 See by way of introduction: Coppel & O'Neill, The European Court of Justice: Taking 
Rights Seriously? 29 CML REV. 669 (1992) claiming the ECJ clearly subordinates human rights 
to the end of closer economic integration in the Community" at 691-2; cf. J.H.H. Weiler and 
Nicolas J. Lockhart, "Taking Rights Seriously" Seriously: The European Court and Fundamental 
Rights Jurisprudence 32 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 51, 579 (1995).   
     139 Paulette L. Stenzel, Can NAFTA'S Environemtnal Provisions Promote Sustainable 
Development? 59 ALA. L. REV. 423 (1995); David S. Baron, NAFTA and the Environment - 
Making the Side Agreement Work 12 ARIZ. J. INTL'L & COMP. L. 543 (1995); Robert F. 
Housman and Paul M. Orbuch, Integrating Labor and Environmental Concerns into the NAFTA: 
A Look Back and a Look Ahead 8 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 719 (1993); SIMON BRONITT, 
FIONA BURNS, DAVID KINLEY, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 
Chapter 12 (1995); Procureur De La Republique v ADBHU [1985] ECR 531 paras. 12-13: "..the 
 59
 
 
 
                                                                            
 
The problem with a universalizing process that is undertaken by a trade based constitutionalism 
is that it runs the risk of privileging trade over the attached substantive principle at very least 
where the two conflict. In terms of intellectual property this risk may not be so much of a 
problem as the points of conflict will be rare, as the more trade one does the more valuable the 
intellectual property regime becomes. This then may be a unique mixing, primarily due to the 
commercial nature of the TRIPS regime (moral rights are excluded from it); which perhaps 
indicates that the trade regime has already dominated the construction of this substantive law by 
limiting the content of law it will embrace.  
 
d) Is Substantive Law Transferable? 
 
Another interesting question which acts to illuminate linkage is the extent to which substantive 
laws can be applied in a universal and acontextual way. Comparative lawyers for many years 
argued as to the merits of transferring substantive laws between different cultures.140  
principle of freedom of trade is not to be viewed in absolute terms but is subject to limits that are 
of general interest”; Community v Denmark (Beverage Containers Case) [1988] ECR 4607 
paras. 8-9.  
     140 Consider: Spencer Weber Waller, Neorealism and the International Harmonization of Law: 
Lessons from Antitrust 42 KANSAS L. REV. 557 (1994); Hessel E. Yntema, Comparative 
Research and Unification of Law 41 MICH. L. REV. 261. (1944); MONTESQUIEU, THE 
SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Anne Cohler et al eds. & trans 1989); Alan Watson, Legal Transplants 
and Law Reform, 92 LAW Q. REV 79 (1976); Bernhard Grossfeld, Geography and Law, MICH. 
L. REV. 1510 (1984); FRIEDRICH C. VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE 
FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE 30 (A. Hayward trans. 1931); FREDERICK 
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While these lawyers found strong disagreement the value of their argument is to suggest that not 
all cultures will necessarily support similar laws. This raises some doubt about the effectiveness 
of TRIPS, for if universalizing is diametrically opposed to cultural diversity, then this new 
regime may work very poorly. My suggestion is that the principle of ubiquity, has strengthened 
universalization in relation to ubiquitous properties (e.g. computer programs) and technologies 
(e.g. internet) to a point where cultural difference, at least in the legal landscape, is all but 
eviscerated.   
 
So the question of the transference of law scholars: "does law have an ethnography?"  disappears 
in the pervasiveness of ubiquitous property and technology.  Domestic conditions are no longer 
the focus, rather it is the commercial property driving the law, which appears to transcend all 
cultural boundaries. 
 
POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 111-135 
(2nd ed 1898); HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, 
JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881); Eric Stein, Uses, Misuses and Non Uses of Comparative 
Law 72 NW. U. L. REV. 198 (1977); O. Khan-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative 
Law, 37 MOD L. REV. 1 (1974); ROBERT SEIDMAN, THE STATE, LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT (1978); JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS 
RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990); Spencer Weber 
Waller, Cultural Conceptions of Competition: Antitrust and American Business Abroad 44 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1251 (1995) Andrew I Gavil, Competition and Cooperation on Sherman 
Island: An Antitrust Ethnography, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1251 (1995)   
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Summary: Overall, linkage has been generated by the realization that a ubiquitous type of 
property needs the more dynamic, trade/movement based regime, to serve its purposes rather 
than the static and traditional public international regime. This linkage has been aided by the fact 
that ubiquitous property is a valuable commodity of international trade. But the value of property 
in international trade cannot be a primary reason for linkage, for if it were one would expect a 
general code of property rights attached to GATT.  What is an important supplement, is the 
effectiveness of the trade regime in generating compliance, which in itself appears to rise out of 
the dynamic or moving character of the trade regime. That is, the trade regime is effective 
because as it acts as a pathway it has the ability (held by the international community) to coerce 
through closing off the pathway. The traditional public international law regime being rooted in 
territorial sovereignty and integrity lacks an ability to coerce.  In point form: 
 
 1) Intellectual property, a ubiquitous property, is linked to trade because the trade regime 
has an ability to conceptualize the movement (ubiquity) of states;  
 
 2) The trade regime is effective in implementing intellectual property rights because, it is 
premised on the notion of movement of states, and this movement is subject to the 
consent of the international community.    
 
PART V: A THEORY OF UNIVERSALITY: SOME CONCLUSIONS  
 
Having assessed the process through which intellectual property has been appended to the trade 
regime it is appropriate to draw this article to a close with some thoughts on, the construction of 
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universal substantive norms in the post cold war international legal system; a theory as to how 
nations of all descriptions will act to construct universal substantive norms.  TRIPS is an 
indication that while first world "bullying" will produce a problematical regime141 the seeds of a 
theory of universality have been sown.  
 
This is a universality that (desirably) will entail construction in the truest sense, it will not be a 
given of the first world, rather a negotiated mid point where the trade interests of all provide the 
moderating equation.142 However this is a universality that will not be built issue by issue but as 
a package upon the back of the trade regime. This will have the inevitable consequences of trade 
being privileged over substance except where the two are compatible. 
 
This type of universality, will operate effectively only in the situation where the trade and 
substantive principle are both heading in the same direction (meaning more trade prospers the 
substantive principle), where the substance is negotiated; and only upon the back of the trade 
 
     141 WILLIAM ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE (1995); 
William Alford, Forum: Taiwan and the GATT: Panel Three: Intellectual Property, Trade and 
Taiwan: a GATT-Fly's View COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 97, 107 (1992): ".. if GATT is not to 
replicate errors of the past, particularly with respect to issues of development .. it must devise 
rules that speak honestly to and with compassion for the needs of all concerned"  
 
     142 Reichman supra n 91, commenting prior to TRIPS on the differing attitudes towards 
intellectual property wrote: "Between the two extremes lies a gray area in which the legitimate 
economic policies pursued by different states overlap and conflict. The resulting tensions can be 
lessened through good faith negotiation and cooperation between states, in a manner that takes 
into account the interests of the developed countries without prejudicing the interests of 
developing countries: at 814."  
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principle. Issues not fitting these requirements will either endure a compromised trade influenced 
universal norm, or revert back to the single issue fora of public international law. Distinguishing 
which process will be capable of doing what, is a question for the points of linkage, and the 
effectiveness of linkage, which are what this article is about. Making clear the points of linkage 
and the conditions of effectiveness will go a long way towards explaining how law amongst "all" 
nations is universalized.  
 
The process for universalizing substantive international law through linkage will work best 
where the issues of concern display some sense of ubiquity. It will be these issues that strike up a 
logical appendage to the trade regime. The problem is though that as the world comes closer 
together through technology (more integrative) all concerns may display some sense of ubiquity, 
suggesting the trade regime will replace the public international regime in the area of substantive 
international law. This is a worry as many may perceive143 trade domination will turn the 
universalizing process away from equity or justice, towards economic criteria like efficiency. 
However while the process of linkage will be guided by ubiquity its ultimate success will depend 
on its equity and negotiability. The packaging, ubiquity and effectiveness of the trade regime will 
make it a powerful force in universalizing substantive international law, perhaps less kind, but 
ultimately it must please all. The next ten to twenty years will explain in the context of TRIPS 
just how important ubiquity and equity are to universalizing substantive international law. One 
should imagine both are of great importance.  
 
 
     143 David Kennedy, Receiving the International, supra n 34, 2-3, 10-15, 24-26.  
 64
 
 
 
When agreement on susbstantive issues is found and locked in with the trade regime it will be 
much more effective (universalized), through judicial enforcement, than in traditional public 
international law, especially as it is attached to a regime that has popular support; this will be the 
strongest substantive international law that we have ever known. Time then for public 
international law to take notice and learn. This may in the long term force public international 
law to invoke the notion of multi issue/fora treaty making (omnibus treaties), to seek out its 
universal principles inherent in the realm of process (coexistence) and to employ compulsory 
jurisdiction.  
 
This highlights the institutional incapacity/failure of the traditional public international law 
regime to provide an effective mechanism for constructing and then enforcing substantive 
international law. In contrast, this article has been designed to show how the trade regime acts as 
a powerful constitutional system, due to its underlying focus on the state in movement. This 
notion that the trade regime talks to pathways of commerce, explains why problems with 
ubiquitous property are logically allied with this regime. It has the ability to understand their 
ubiquitous nature much better than public international law and an ability (not absolute) to secure 
compliance. For in the international trade regime the starting premise is a universal, controlled by 
sovereign community, whereas in the public international regime the starting point is sovereign 
difference, controlled by sovereign autonomy. In the trade regime the ubiquitous notion of trade 
is needed by all and (at least in theory) owned by all.  
 
In summary, one perceives a powerful law making process in the trade regime that promises to 
dominate the construction of substantive international law in the near future.  
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CONCLUSION: MAPPING THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS THAT GENERATE 
[CONSTRUCT AND UNIVERSALIZE] INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The deepest value of this article is that it offers to conceptualize, to create a framework through 
which to understand, the changing nature of international legal obligations. This is a project 
about constitutionalism, about systems, about frameworks, and in the end understanding a 
rapidly changing international legal landscape. Without research like this the "internationals" 
remain fragmented and disjointed, which denies critical evaluation of any effectiveness.  
 
The primary aim of this article is to provoke people who read it to ask: "why has intellectual 
property law been appended to GATT?" and have them give justifications more profound than: 
"linkage occurs because intellectual property is important to the USA due to its prominence in 
international trade."  Such an answer does not adequately explain why it is the trade regime that 
is used as the vehicle for universalizing international intellectual property law and not the public 
international law regime. I wish to draw out debate on linkage and its effectiveness. My own 
view, expounded above, is that the trade regime is fluid and moving and in this sense makes a 
natural and effective vehicle for constructing and universalizing subtantive laws relating to 
ubiquitous issues.    
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